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Perspectives on African Studies and 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Leo J. de Haan 
Abstract: In this farewell lecture on the occasion of his departure as Profes-
sor of Development in sub-Saharan Africa at Leiden University and Director 
of the African Studies Centre (ASC), Leiden, the author starts with the 
vuvuzela issue as an illustration of the lack of confidence the world has in 
South Africa organizing and running the World Cup smoothly. He takes that 
as a sign that there still exists a stereotype of African incompetence, despite 
the social and economic progress Africa has witnessed in the last decade. He 
does not want to argue that African Studies have not been able to offset 
such a stereotype. What he tries to show is that it is not clear from the 
wealth of actor-oriented research in African Studies what the main social, 
political and economic trends in Africa are. He argues that actor-oriented 
research in African Studies should try to increase its relevance by contribut-
ing—through meta-analyses and comparative research—to the discussion on 
social, political and economic trends in Africa. Special attention should be 
paid to the possible rise of the developmental state in Africa. In doing so, 
African Studies may also substantiate its claim that it is able to challenge the 
universal pretensions of mainstream social science. 
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The following text documents the farewell lecture on the occasion of the departure 
of Prof. Leo J. de Haan as Professor of Development in sub-Saharan Africa at 
Leiden University and Director of the African Studies Centre (ASC), Leiden, on 
Monday, April 12, 2010. 
 
Meneer de Rector Magnificus, 
Members of the Board of Governors of the African Studies Centre, 
Dear Listeners,  
 
This is a vuvuzela. It is an instrument that is very popular these days among 
South African football supporters and is used to spur on their favourite 
team. There is fierce competition in South Africa among producers, who all 
make their own versions and cannot agree who is entitled to call their plastic 
horns vuvuzelas or not.1 Everything on this particular example would indicate 
that it was produced in South Africa, but maybe it was imported from 
China—who knows? 
During the Confederations Cup last year—a kind of dress rehearsal for 
this summer’s World Cup—the rest of the world heard this instrument for 
the first time. A campaign immediately started to ban it during the World 
Cup as a stadium full of vuvuzelas produces such an alarmingly high level of 
noise that it was felt that foreign teams might be intimidated. I have to ad-
mit that when watching a match during the Confederations Cup, I did won-
der whether my TV’s sound system had broken. A stadium full of vuvuzelas 
really does generate a lot of noise. 
I do not intend to speak this afternoon about musical instruments from 
Africa nor about football. However, I think the vuvuzela issue illustrates the 
lack of confidence the world has in South Africa organizing and running the 
World Cup smoothly. There has generally been little confidence about the 
stadiums and other infrastructure projects being completed on time. And 
others think South Africa is extremely dangerous for foreign football sup-
porters and that national football teams should be heavily protected while 
there. In brief, there is little confidence that an African country could man-
age to organize such an event successfully. Yet, we are dealing here with the 
most well-organized country on the continent. Apparently, there still exists 
in the world a stereotype of African incompetence, despite the social and 
economic progress Africa has witnessed in the last decade. 
                                                 
1  See E. van Gelder (2009: 53–55, 2010); I thank Maaike Westra for drawing my 
attention to this story. Interestingly, advocates of the vuvuzela have assumed a typi-
cal African authenticity and established links with all kinds of cultural traditions in 
which wind instruments made of animal horns play a role. However, one expert in 
African music dismissed the vuvuzela as an “un-African” instrument. 




Fifty years ago the image of Africa was completely different. Expecta-
tions were high then and there was a feeling of euphoria across much of 
Africa. Not everywhere though, because in April 1960 the ANC was banned 
in South Africa after the Sharpville massacre a month earlier and in Algeria 
the so-called “Battle of Algiers” was still going on. In other countries, how-
ever, independence movements—broadly composed of political parties, 
farmers’ organizations, trade unions, traditional associations and churches—
were winning a say in government. In some countries, this process of de-
colonization went smoothly and self-governance was introduced effortlessly. 
But in others it was preceded by many years of struggle involving strikes, 
boycotts, riots and even guerrilla warfare. No fewer than thirteen countries 
gained independence in 1960 and will celebrate fifty years of independence 
this year (or cinquantenaire, because many of these countries are franco-
phone). 
Independence movements had managed to unite all grievances and dis-
content—be it about civil rights, land grab, crop prices or licences—in the 
demand for independence. Independence became synonymous with social 
and economic progress and initially the promise of progress was rewarded. 
In the 1950s colonies had started a policy of investing in infrastructure, crop 
improvement, land conservation, education and health. Many new African 
states continued to follow this investment policy with great verve. Eco-
nomic growth continued until the 1970s but then collapsed, and disap-
pointment set in. Only since the end of the 1990s have some of the high 
expectations of fifty years ago begun to materialize. This afternoon, I would 
like to comment on the type of research in African studies about this issue. 
But first I would like to clarify which Africa I am talking about. In other 
words, where is Africa exactly and what is African Studies all about? 
Where is Africa? 
In his inaugural lecture some years ago, my colleague Peter Pels2 drew 
quotation marks in the air when he was talking about Africa to illustrate his 
dilemma. To me as a geographer, it is at first sight much simpler. Geogra-
phers, by the very nature of their discipline, are used to delimiting areas. In 
human geography it is acceptable to take a physical, geographic entity as 
point of departure for further examination in the knowledge that the inter-
action between physical environment and society is intense, and that many 
societal processes can be meaningfully delimited for further research with 
                                                 
2  Professor in Cultural Anthropology and Sociology of Africa South of the Sahara—
in particular the modern period—at Leiden University.  
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the help of physical boundaries. That consideration invites Africa to be 
considered a continent with surrounding islands. Also in daily life this is not 
an unusual idea: The African Union unites all countries on the African con-
tinent; all countries are also members of the Economic Commission for 
Africa, a regional UN organization; and they borrow from the African De-
velopment Bank. They take part in the Association of African Universities 
(AAU) and their national football teams compete for the Africa Cup of 
Nations. In summary, the African continent is part of the world of states. 
In other cases however, the idea of Africa is not limited to the conti-
nent. Pan-Africanism as it emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century 
explicitly includes African diasporas, not in the least Afro-Americans in the 
US. On the other hand, my professorship at this university3 renders Africa a 
bit smaller as it limits Africa to sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. all countries south of 
the Sahara. One might think that in this case the Sahara is being used as a 
physical, geographical boundary, leaving out North Africa. And indeed there 
are good historical, economic, cultural and political reasons to see North 
Africa as “Middle Eastern” or “Mediterranean” as Braudel (1949) did, rather 
than as part of Africa. But the crux of the matter is not why North Africa 
should be counted as part of something else but instead why sub-Saharan 
Africa should be dealt with separately. Appiah (1992) showed that underly-
ing all political, cultural or economic arguments there is a predominantly 
historical-racial argument. This part of Africa was considered by European 
colonizers to be “populated by the Black race”. Obviously in this context 
Black was not a biological but ideological concept. Black was synonymous 
with “uncivilized” and “inferior” and the people there had to be “civilized” 
or, in other words, “colonized”. Black Africa—as “sub-Saharan Africa” is 
more a contemporary euphemism—is a colonial invention, a mythical justi-
fication for colonization. However, as frequently happens, myths become 
reality and eventually the identity formation of Africans, regardless of how 
different their traditional cultures are or were, was shaped according to 
Appiah by that myth and the continuous struggle against it. In that sense, 
delimitating Africa to sub-Saharan Africa has become reality4 and also the 
area of research for the African Studies Centre (ASC), Leiden, and the field 
of African Studies.  
This delimitation is, of course, relative. After all, sub-Saharan Africa is 
an integral part of a globalizing world, with all the influences from elsewhere 
that impact it and the forces from the region itself that have an impact else-
                                                 
3  My chair is in “Development in sub-Sahara Africa” at the Institute of Cultural 
Anthropology and Development Sociology, the Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden 
University.  
4  Thus including recognition of its racist roots (Appiah 1992: 38–41, 289). 




where. Raw materials from sub-Saharan Africa are of strategic importance to 
the global superpowers, intra-African migration is bringing sub-Saharan 
Africa and North Africa closer together, and African diasporas in other 
parts of the world are exerting an influence elsewhere. Sometimes the ASC 
is inclined to put a fence around its area of studies, but it is also aware that, 
depending on the issue, another cross-section of the world like “all countries 
around the Indian Ocean” or “all Islamic countries” can at times be more 
appropriate.5 
What is African Studies? 
The explanation above regarding the area of studies leads us to another 
interesting question, about what the study of sub-Saharan Africa—usually 
called African Studies—should contain.  
The roots of this field of study are unmistakably in the colonial period, 
very specifically so in some of the larger European countries, for economic 
and political reasons and later for religious reasons too. They increasingly 
colluded in an all-encompassing civilization mission where it was necessary 
to know and understand Africa better. Only when the Netherlands lost the 
Dutch East Indies did it also become interested in Africa. It was therefore in 
1947 that the Africa Institute, one of the predecessors of the ASC, was 
founded in Rotterdam (de Bok 2000: 11).  
These were turbulent times in African Studies. The independence 
movement was striving for both political freedom and also for intellectual 
freedom and was starting to criticize the colonial roots of this field of stud-
ies, which meant—and sometimes still does—that Europeans and other 
non-Africans were “denied” the right to produce knowledge about Africa 
(Melber 2009). Admittedly, the risk of what Said (2003) called “Oriental-
ism”—the aggregate of erroneous assumptions about non-Western cultures 
motivated by Western prejudices—was and is valid for African Studies too. 
But the idea that only Africans who live in Africa can write with authority 
about Africa is mistaken.6 African Studies is a motley of scientists of diverg-
ing identities who write about Africa: men and women, black and white, 
from Africa and not from Africa or from Africa but living in the US, British 
and French with a colonial past or Dutch without a colonial past in Africa 
(at least in the eyes of those who do not know history), and neo-liberal and 
neo-Marxist, etc. (see also Melber 2005). 
                                                 
5  For this reason, the Library, Documentation and Information Department at the 
ASC also has an interesting collection on North Africa. 
6  Melber 2005: 372 refers among others to Mbembe (1999: 3). 
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In this motley, the ASC has established its own place. The Centre feels 
it is playing a leading role in Europe and Africa with pioneering research in 
and about African societies with a focus on social-cultural, economic and 
political processes. These processes are not only analysed in their mutual 
relationships but also in connection with other societal phenomena else-
where in the world. Research at the Centre is multidisciplinary, not just be-
cause societal realities are complex but also because the understanding of a 
particular region requires a combination of perspectives. This means that a 
whole range of social disciplines are represented at the ASC, and that 
through multidisciplinarity there is added value.7 Additional complementar-
ity is being obtained through external programmes of collaboration. A 
strong emphasis on empirical research in Africa in collaboration with Afri-
can researchers is an important hallmark of the ASC without neglecting 
other sources of information inside and outside Africa. 
On the basis of research done at the Centre or in African Studies at 
large, it should not be too difficult to explain why only recently it looks as if 
at least some of Africa’s high expectations of fifty years ago are going to be 
met. However, that question is more difficult to answer and to make that 
clear I will comment on: (1) actor-oriented research on the livelihoods of the 
poorest in sub-Saharan Africa and (2) research on the role of the state. 
                                                 
7  Multidisciplinary collaboration requires a sense of critical reflection from the 
researchers involved on their own disciplinary methodology and an openness and 
interest with respect to the disciplinary methodologies of their fellow researchers. 
Multidisciplinary research strives to integrate various methodologies and can some-
times benefit from “fuzzy” forms of conceptualization and modelling. Chabal and 
Daloz  (2006: 322) call for an eclectic approach including an awareness of the lim-
ited validity of disciplinary concepts and theories. There is not only one suitable 
methodology for researching particular phenomena. 
 N.B. This is completely different from the “theoretical or conceptual pot-
pourri” for which Chabal (op. cit.: 473) criticizes African Studies. There he points 
to the danger that students of African Studies are confronted with a diverse range 
of subjects without having the proper methodological training to be able to per-
form scholarly work. I agree that programmes in African Studies face this risk: 
They often have students who do not yet have sufficient methodological training in 
their original discipline and subsequently introduce them in a sketchy way and with 
a view to interdisciplinarity to themes and accompanying methodologies from other 
disciplines without probing into their original or another disciplinary methodologi-
cal training. According to Chabal, this results in “identity specialists with little serious 
training debat[ing] points of political correctness”. 




Actor-Oriented Research, Livelihoods and  
Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa 
World poverty has decreased over the last few decades. The number of 
people living on less than 1 USD a day (and because of the rising cost of 
living in developing countries the current rate is set at 1.25 USD a day) 
dropped between 1980 and 2005 by half a billion to 1.4 billion. However in 
sub-Saharan Africa the situation has not improved: In 1981 half the popula-
tion lived on less than 1 USD a day and in 2005 this was still the case. The 
1996 figure was the worst with 58 per cent of the population of sub-Saharan 
Africa living on less than 1 USD a day. In absolute numbers, the figure even 
increased from 200 million to 380 million between 1981 and 2005 (Chen 
and Ravallion 2008: 27; World Bank 2009: 47–48).  
Since 1960, there has only been one reliable statistical indicator avail-
able to measure an increase in standard of living, namely GDP per capita 
figures. Between 1960 and 2006, GDP per capita hardly improved in sub-
Saharan Africa although, interestingly, the region did show economic 
growth way into the 1970s. However in the 1980s and 1990s there was a 
disastrous decline in growth and it was not until the late 1990s that recovery 
finally started (Ghosh 2008; World Bank 2005: 277). 
The use of poverty indicators, which are indicators of economic growth 
or income, can admittedly be criticized. As I have argued elsewhere, the 
quality of human life or “the good life” as it is often made operational in 
livelihood research, is much more than material welfare. Poverty is multidi-
mensional: It involves access to resources and influencing opportunities, and 
only a holistic approach will result in a proper understanding of poverty in 
specific contexts (de Haan and Zoomers 2005). 
The Chronic Poverty Research Centre in Manchester has attempted to 
establish a poverty indicator that would both comply with these insights and 
be able to highlight the poverty situation in Africa retrospectively.8 However 
this picture does not differ very much from the one just sketched. Of all 
sub-Saharan African countries, just Mauritius saw a consistent drop in pov-
erty rates between 1970 and 2003.9 In all other sub-Saharan African coun-
tries poverty only improved in one or two aspects regarding chronic pov-
erty, or not at all. Another indicator that to a certain extent tries to do justice 
to the critique of poverty researchers mentioned above, namely the Human 
Development Index, is only available since 1990. It confirms the impression 
                                                 
8  The Chronic Poverty Index is composed of four indicators: “relatively low GDP 
per capita and relatively high mortality, fertility and undernourishment” (Chronic 
Poverty Research Centre 2008: 14). 
9  Op. cit.: 15. 
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that only since the late 1990s has the poverty situation in sub-Saharan Africa 
improved, though no more rapidly so than in the rest of the world.10 
Interestingly, this long-term trend in the standard of living after inde-
pendence, followed by straightforward deterioration and a recent rebound is 
not reflected very clearly in actor-oriented research, which is so important at 
the ASC, and in African Studies in general. Actor-oriented research is a type 
of research that tries to describe and explain the concrete actions of actors, 
mostly individuals, households or families but sometimes also larger units. 
The problem statement with respect to these actions can be of a socio-cul-
tural, socio-economic, political or even ecological nature. From this actor-
oriented research, a much-diffused picture emerges of the trend in standards 
of living in sub-Saharan Africa for various reasons which will be discussed 
below. 
In the first place, and contrary to what might be expected, poor and 
even deteriorating living conditions do not always play a role in the problem 
statement or even the contextualization of actor-oriented research. My im-
pression is that it is the case in politically oriented research questions be-
cause issues like “claim-making” and “voice” have been directly linked to 
living conditions. But in socio-culturally inspired research questions—even 
those on identity and ethnicity—living conditions play a less prominent role, 
much to my regret. This is all the more striking since it is the other way 
around in poverty research, which expressly includes political and socio-
cultural factors in the analysis. 
But what is more important is the second reason, i.e. the so-called “mi-
cro-macro paradox”. The above-mentioned trends in standards of living in 
Africa are average figures and an enormous variety of concrete situations 
may be hidden behind average trends, which tend to emerge in actor-ori-
ented research.  
Kanbur (2001) argued that it is quite possible that poverty is decreasing 
on a national scale, while the living conditions of important groups in the 
population are worsening. This is in fact a methodological problem of ag-
gregation. He also feels it is possible that improvements in living conditions 
in the long term may be determined or could be expected—for example 
after economic reforms—while the immediate effect on everyday reality 
might be unemployment, rising prices, lower food consumption and a drop 
                                                 
10  The Human Development Index (HDI) has been used since 1990 and is composed 
of three indicators representing the basic dimensions of human development: a 
long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. The HDI’s mini-
mum value is 0 and its maximum value is 1. The HDI for the whole of sub-Sahara 
Africa rose from 0.464 in 1998 to 0.514 in 2007, while worldwide HDI rose from 
0.712 in 1998 to 0.753 in 2007 (UNDP 2009: 174; UNDP 2000: 160). 




in school enrolment figures. This is in fact a methodological problem of 
time horizon (caused by a difference in time horizon). Macro-economic 
studies have established that recent economic growth in Africa has resulted 
in a decrease in poverty but there are indications that this improvement has 
not extended to peripheral regions and areas with a high variability in pre-
cipitation, to groups with little education and little access to land (women in 
particular) and to groups with increased health risks (Christiaensen, Demery 
and Paternostro 2003). Therefore, Kanbur—once a World Bank Chief 
Economist—has called on macro economists, financial specialists and pol-
icy-makers at international financial institutions to take the arguments of 
development specialists, social scientists and advocacy workers seriously and 
to attempt conciliation.11 However in my view, the debate on macro trends 
and micro experience will be unending if the perspectives at the level of 
aggregation and on the time horizon do not get closer. Also actor-oriented 
research needs to carefully think about this and to work on a solution. In the 
following I will explain how. 
Thirdly, there is a school of actor-oriented research in Africa in which 
actors’ poor living conditions play a central role, namely livelihood research 
(de Haan 2007; de Haan and Zoomers 2006), and my personal research is 
part of this school. But this type of research can also be criticized. Liveli-
hood research departs from the capacities and abilities of actors and analyses 
the way they organize their livelihoods on the basis of available material and 
non-material resources. And the way they obtain these resources or provide 
themselves access to these resources and the results of that in terms of qual-
ity of existence is part of the analysis.12 In livelihood research, an increased 
awareness has developed that the quality of life means much more than 
material welfare in terms of income, yield or even health. A holistic ap-
proach to livelihoods is necessary in which a wealth of dimensions—cul-
tural, social, economic and political—are included in the analysis for a better 
understanding of the complexity of livelihoods. As a result, livelihood re-
search is digging deeper to gain analytical quality. However, attention for 
this multidimensionality of livelihoods and the necessity of a holistic analysis 
                                                 
11  Kanbur 2001: 1093; I thank Marion Eeckhout for drawing my attention to this 
paper. 
12  In livelihood research there are different emphases too. Attention to the location of 
the resources used has resulted in new insights about mobility, migration and ur-
ban-rural complementarities. Attention to issues of sustainability has resulted in an 
improved understanding of the extremely complex ecology of Africa. And attention 
to the vulnerability of livelihoods caused by ecological and climatological variability 
has proved conceptually too restricted in view of the vulnerabilities to war and 
HIV/AIDS. By taking these into consideration, vulnerability has become a mature 
concept. 
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also brings distortions. Firstly, with the progression of insights into the 
complexity of livelihoods, an unconcealed admiration has developed for the 
endurance and creativity of actors and their ability to combine diverging and 
often widely dispersed resources and activities into a livelihood. Many liveli-
hoods are without doubt harsh and tough but actors find a certain satisfac-
tion in them and attain self-realization. Even in cases of survival at a very 
basic level of existence, the determination of the pro-active actor catches the 
eye of the reader as if the researcher wants to demonstrate that surviving is 
an art. A rosy picture is implicitly being sketched.    
Secondly—and returning to the micro-macro paradox—because of the 
desire to scrutinize the complexity of livelihoods, the scale of research re-
mains limited. In general, we are dealing with case studies that only cover 
one or two localities. It is often said that livelihoods are globalizing, i.e. are 
part and parcel of the process of globalization, but they are usually not re-
searched beyond their locality.  
In summary, actor-oriented research is unfortunately often too opti-
mistic and too micro. 
My fourth comment on actor-oriented research in African Studies is 
the lack of historical depth, or perhaps this is better phrased as a lack of full 
exploration of the historical dimension because actor-oriented research is 
historicizing, i.e an analysis of the historical roots of a contemporary situa-
tion, does receive attention. That is all right but I plead for more than that. 
Particularly the development of livelihoods—i.e. the composition, back-
grounds and results over a certain period—needs to be mapped. Conse-
quently, I am appealing for more longitudinal actor-oriented studies.   
A final comment on actor-oriented research, which partly follows from 
the comments mentioned above, is what Chabal (2005) called the “excessive 
specialization” in African Studies when pointing at the rigid focus on spe-
cific ethnic groups and countries where self-referencing groups of scientists 
tend to coagulate. According to Chabal, these groups leave without achiev-
ing any scientific progress because they have given the uniqueness of their 
case an unassailable status. This results in a “tautology of exceptionalism” 
because the only explanation for the observed social behaviour is that actors 
behave as they do “because of who they are” (Chabal 2005: 474). Apparently 
Chabal was aiming his critique first and foremost at his mother country, 
where specialization has at times turned into university infighting between 
research groups specializing in a particular ethnicity. However, he does point 
to a real danger, and African Studies should continuously ensure that scien-
tific progress and relevance are not fostered by staying in closed circles. 
These comments explain why a clear picture about the development of 
long-term trends in standards of living does not emerge from actor-oriented 




research in African Studies. On the one hand, it is logical because an enor-
mous differentiation in living conditions is hidden in averages over the long-
term so the picture can only be diffuse. However, on the other hand there is 
also the challenge of coming to grips with that same endless variation in 
living conditions. Attempts should be made to deduce conclusions from 
actor-oriented research that surpass the micro level and by doing so enter 
the debate about macro trends in standards of living. This roughly applies to 
other themes, too, such as environmental degradation and climate change, 
ethnicity and conflict, and mobility and migration. Consequently, I call for 
two supplementary research strategies: meta-analysis and comparative re-
search.  
Meta-analyses are studies that compare existing case studies and try to 
synthesize them, using a systematic analytical framework. Such studies bring 
together primary data from underlying studies in order to determine if and 
where broader generalizations can be made than would have been possible 
on the basis of individual case studies (McCormick, Rodney and Varcoe 
2003).  
Meta-analyses put stringent requirements on the methodological quality 
of underlying studies because their methodological account must be clear 
and replicable to allow for new analysis and possibly new interpretation. 
Therefore meta-analysis is research of previous research and not just a syn-
thesis of previous findings. And qualitative meta-analysis is not just a syn-
thesis of conclusions and insights from previous research, although it is 
sometimes called meta-synthesis (Boeije 2010: 154; Thyer 2010: 654). 
Qualitative meta-analysis has to penetrate the theoretical and methodologi-
cal points of departure of underlying studies because all the findings and 
conclusions depend on them and all analysis would otherwise be built on 
quicksand.  
Qualitative meta-analysis of actor-oriented research is still little known 
but is an interesting methodology for African Studies to explore and develop 
(see Reveney 2005; Glasmeier and Farrigan 2005). It does not only offer a 
fruitful counterweight against excessive specialization but also opens up 
opportunities for debate from a micro perspective about macro trends in 
poverty and development in Africa. 
Meta-analysis is supplementary to the other research strategy I propose, 
more comparative research. Comparative research does not necessarily have 
to aim for broad generalizations for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa be-
cause research comparing different parts of Africa can also be interesting. 
However, comparative research does mean research that systematically traces 
similarities and differences on the basis of a comparative explanatory 
framework, or that tries to challenge existing theories with comparative 
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empirical data. After all, there are only two scientific justifications for the 
existence of a social science research centre specifically oriented towards 
Africa. The first is that Africa is something special and different from the 
rest of the world, and therefore should be taken separately and needs its 
own formulation of theories. The ASC dissociates itself from such a view, as 
will have become clear from my earlier arguments.13 The other justification 
that we support at the ASC is that what is being presented in the main-
stream of social sciences as universal models or theories of societal proc-
esses are in fact Western or North Atlantic particularities. Therefore, main-
stream social sciences must be challenged on their universal pretensions by 
empirical material from other parts of the world, and not just from Africa 
but also from Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and/or Latin Amer-
ica.14 It even means that the Asian model for economic growth, which is 
now catching on in development theory after the bankruptcy of models 
inspired by Europe and North America, must be challenged for its part. To 
my great satisfaction, the ASC and the Royal Netherlands Institute of South 
East Asian and Caribbean Studies in Leiden have already accepted this chal-
lenge of comparative research. Our joint programme entitled “Tracking 
Development” is examining and comparing historical development path-
ways of a number of African and South East Asian countries. I sincerely 
hope that much more comparative research both within the ASC and in 
collaboration with external research groups will follow. 
Kanbur (2001: 1090) also mentioned another difference of opinion, 
namely the salutary effects of liberalized markets. Theoretically they are free 
and lead to an efficient allocation of scarce resources but in practice there 
are clear differences in power between market parties and, consequently, 
markets are not particularly free. Initially, power relations and differences in 
power remained underexposed in actor-oriented research on livelihoods. 
The presentation of pro-active actors at the micro-level organizing their 
livelihoods introduced an unproblematic presentation with respect to power 
relations,15 with the emphasis on the creative way in which actors were busy 
with their resources and capitals. As a result, power relations as a mecha-
                                                 
13  This would be the “Exotic Africa” of tourist brochures. See also p. 99 about Orien-
talism. By the way, neither would the other extreme, namely that Africa is nothing 
special, justify the existence of a separate research centre as the ASC. 
14  See Bates, Mudimbe and O’Barr (1993). The editors’ intentions here have been 
explicitly to demonstrate that African Studies contributes to scientific progress in 
the various disciplines. Of course, it can also be considered a call for African Stud-
ies to have a permanent status at American universities.  
15  See de Haan and Zoomers (2005). Looking back at more than ten years of liveli-
hood research, Clark and Carney (2008) argue that power relations have often re-
mained underexposed. 




nism that brings about inequality and social exclusion were neglected. I feel 
that this problem has now been overcome and power relations are receiving 
ample attention in livelihood research. But there should not only be a focus 
on local power relations but also on the relationship between local impeding 
structures and supra-local structures—in other words, the functioning of 
supra-local institutions.16 It is particularly in this field that an important link 
must be established between national and regional government policies and 
the supposed neo-patrimonial character of the state in Africa and the need 
for the rise of the development state. After all, it is usually thought that the 
state has an important role to play in regulating power relations and remov-
ing bottlenecks to allow an emancipation of the poor.   
The State in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The role of the state in development in sub-Saharan Africa is critically as-
sessed from the deeply rooted idea that societies are “makeable”—at least to 
a certain degree—and that governments should devote themselves to this 
task. And since, as indicated above, little long-term improvement has been 
seen in standards of living, doubts have arisen about the effectiveness of the 
state and questions are being asked about the formation of the state in Af-
rica. 
African governments are considered by the outside world to be corrupt 
and the state is used by political elites to secure their own interests and those 
of the rank and file in their own ethnic group. Moreover, political power is 
not based on legal rules, elected representatives and accompanying account-
ability but instead on informal ethnic bonds or family ties and traditions of 
authoritarian rule. A state conceptualized in this manner is called neo-patri-
monial and is a mixture or a result of the two extremes on a conceptual 
continuum running from patrimonial, where all political and administrative 
relations are personal relations, to legal-rational, where relations are formal 
and the public and the private are separate. In the neo-patrimonial state, 
public and private spheres are formally separated and accepted formal rules 
do exist but in practice they can easily be replaced by the personal and the 
informal. It is sometimes erroneously argued that one can talk about a for-
mal façade with a factual, informal reality behind it. From this view, African 
states are bedecked with a constitution and all kinds of laws, with ministries, 
parliaments and even elections. But this only creates a make-believe world, a 
façade that the country needs in order to be able to play a role in the “world 
of states”, to be a member of the United Nations and to receive develop-
                                                 
16  This goes for all actor-oriented research in African Studies. 
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ment aid. However, façade is the wrong metaphor: Patrimonial and legal-
rational elements function at the same time in the neo-patrimonial state and 
so both are reality.17 This is also an important insight from the Internation-
ale Samenwerking programme entitled “The State in Africa” that the ASC is 
running in collaboration with the Africa Directorate at the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Why is this such an important discussion? Because it is claimed that 
once a state is more patrimonial and less legal-rational (i.e. more corrupt and 
practising favouritism), it is less able to develop the country, i.e. be a devel-
opmental state.18 And that turns out to be wide of the empirical truth, as 
comparative research has made clear. The Tracking Development research 
programme mentioned earlier has shown that neo-patrimonial states can 
also be developmental states in that they can fulfil a central role in the proc-
ess of capital accumulation (or primitive accumulation) for economic 
growth. The recent report by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (WRR)19 has paid much attention to this point but, contrary to what 
the report postulates, we are not dealing with a sliding scale, a continuum 
from neo-patrimonial to developmental state (WRR 2010: 75–76). Less neo-
patrimony does not automatically mean more development. The question is 
instead when or why a neo-patrimonial state becomes a developmental state 
as well. The answer lies in pressure from society for more welfare and for 
the political-administrative elite to create economic growth because other-
wise its dominant position is in danger. Therefore, and contrary to what is 
often thought, a neo-patrimonial state can be a developmental state at the 
same time.20 
Adequate implementation capacity is seen by the WRR as an essential 
characteristic of a development state.21 This is absolutely correct. It is not 
corruption, clientelism and patronage that need be seen as the problems of 
the neo-patrimonial state, but rather the unpredictability about when and 
where these patrimonial elements occur and when the formal-legal order 
                                                 
17  See Erdmann and Engel (2007) for a clear overview of the debate.  
18  And in the ultimate case, the state runs the risk of becoming a failed state, one that 
can no longer guarantee the security and livelihoods of its population. 
19  WRR is the acronym for“Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid”. 
20  See for a vital contribution to this point Chabal and Daloz (1999). In the discussion 
about the “AFRICA dummy” (the residual factor which after global cross-country 
regression analysis remains and explains the negative economic growth of countries 
in Africa) the neo-patrimonial state takes a prominent place. That state would fa-
vour redistribution and privilege current consumption over investment: see Engle-
bert (2000). For a critique of the supposed chronic growth shortfall in Africa, see 
Jerven (2010). I thank André Leliveld for drawing my attention to these papers.  
21  The report writes “being able to deliver”. WRR 2010: 83. 




takes precedence. Of course, this uncertainty does not advance the imple-
mentation capacity but implementation capacity grows as it become more 
predictable when formal and informal rules are used. Recently some neo-
patrimonial states in sub-Saharan Africa have been very successful in certain 
respects. According to Di John (2010), centralized forms of patronage and 
corruption are able to increase the stability and resilience of the state, for 
example through a central party system that subsequently knows how to 
hold on to regional elites through redistribution. He explicitly mentions 
Tanzania and Zambia, which cannot be considered as developmental states 
but which proved strong enough to withstand the economic crisis of the 
1980s, or at least did not become failed states. According to Di John, South 
Africa, Botswana and Mauritius can all be considered developmental states 
and are indeed countries with a strong party organization and centralized 
patronage. However, a strong party organization and centralized patronage 
are no guarantee of a robust overall implementation capacity. For example, 
South Africa is better at effective taxation than at pursuing an industrializa-
tion policy, and Botswana is performing well with respect to democratic 
institutions but not in combating HIV/AIDS.22 
So neo-patrimonial states do not have to democratize, liberalize and 
outlaw corruption before they can become developmental states.23 But their 
political-administrative elites do have to feel a need—because of political 
pressure from society—to engage in a social contract for economic growth 
with their population instead of just engaging in a redistribution system of 
state revenues based on patronage and a fat bank account abroad. 
However, I have to disappoint those of you who read in my words a 
straightforward plea to fully support so-called “civil society organizations” in 
                                                 
22  R. Werbner (2002), Reasonable Radicals and Citizenship in Botswana. The Public 
Anthropology of Kalanga Elites. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Werbner calls 
Botswana a good, but also exceptional, example of an African state with a strong 
implementation capacity in a relatively open society. He uses the case of Botswana 
to explicitly oppose J. Bayart (1993), The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (Lon-
don: Longman), who argues that the post-colonial state in Africa is characterized by 
co-optation of elites and personal networks of political entrepreneurs, and also J. 
Bayart, S. Ellis and B. Hibou (1999), The Criminalization of the State in Africa (Oxford: 
James Currey) who discuss the intertwining of the state in Africa and criminality. 
23  This does not mean that democratization cannot be a way of putting pressure on 
the political-administrative elite. K. Weghorst and S. Lindberg (2009) in The Role of 
Private and Collective Goods in Elections: Evidence from Ghana (ODI Africa Power & 
Politics Working Paper 5) show that clientelism in Ghana and redistribution 
through patronage are costing more than ever but that during elections more and 
more voters are judging politicians on their performance with respect to develop-
ment. I thank Martin van Vliet for having me reread this paper.  
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Africa.24 Indeed at first sight, one would think that organizations focused on 
endorsing accountability, advocacy, claim-making and empowerment are the 
organizations to articulate political pressure from society. One could think 
here of a civil rights movement, a trade union, a women’s organization or an 
anti-corruption NGO. However, the problem is that these kinds of organi-
zations fit all too well into our model of political reform and their values 
come close to our values. But we also have to think outside the box and 
away from the blueprint. Just as representation and legitimacy in a political 
system do not necessarily have to run via political parties and parliamentary 
elections, it must also remain conceivable that endorsing accountability, 
advocacy and claim-making could be realized through a totally different kind 
of organization—or “social movement”, one could say, or even better, 
“forms of collective action”—than what we have seen so far in Europe or 
Latin America. For example, movements that sometimes do not explicitly 
focus on the state, or even place themselves outside the state such as reli-
gious movements, youth culture or traditional revival associations. Precisely 
by doing so they attain political meaning, as is argued in the recent ASC 
publication Movers and Shakers.25 
To sum up, it may be posited that the state in sub-Saharan Africa barely 
resembles the image we have in Europe of an ideal state. But as I argued, 
there is a possibility that neo-patrimonial state formations, which emerged 
from colonial and pre-colonial articulations and have developed historically, 
do under pressure from internal and external forces end up as developmen-
tal states. Such states will—and I hope this much has become clear to you in 
the meanwhile—still not resemble the Weberian state because the internal 
and external fields of societal forces are different and constantly changing. 
The current international context is moving in the direction of a multi-polar 
world in which a multitude of new actors like China, India and Brazil are 
starting to become active in sub-Saharan Africa. Old geopolitical considera-
tions are disappearing or gaining new meanings, in which Africa’s wealth of 
raw materials is playing a key role. 
For this reason, I would like to dwell on what I would call the intracta-
ble geography of Africa, which is also relevant to the debate on the state in 
Africa.  
                                                 
24  This is a specialization for Dutch development assistance that is particularly fa-
voured by the WRR report, even giving some leeway to support Pentecostal 
Churches and Islamic Brotherhoods (WRR 2010: 271). 
25  Ellis and van Kessel, Introduction: African Social Movements or Social Movements in Africa? 
(Ellis and van Kessel 2009: 1–16). 




The Intractable Geography of Africa 
If one looks for arguments other than government policies for sub-Saharan 
Africa’s lack of development in living standards, two factors come immedi-
ately to mind. High on the list is the colonial and neo-colonial dependency 
on external centres of power. A close runner-up would be the adverse natu-
ral conditions in Africa or, as I call it, the continent’s intractable geography. 
Africa is a large, relatively “closed-off” continent, with many land-
locked countries far from the coast. For centuries it was not an easy conti-
nent to penetrate because of the lack of navigable rivers and this is still a 
relevant geographical feature today. Many sub-Saharan African countries are 
facing demands for investments in infrastructure as they are far from world 
markets and the cost of transporting goods is comparatively high. 
Africa’s climate should also be mentioned. It has a negative impact on 
the continent’s general health due to the prevalence of diseases, like malaria, 
that affect labour productivity and life expectancy (Tang, Woods 2008; 
Bloom and Sachs 1998). Specific interactions of temperature, variability of 
precipitation, and soils mean that the climate directly contributes to the 
complex ecology in Africa and, in turn, limits its agricultural productivity. In 
the last few decades, the growth of agricultural production in sub-Saharan 
Africa has been almost exclusively the result of an expansion in acreage—
not in productivity. The Green Revolution and the technological improve-
ments in agriculture with modern tillage techniques, high-yield crop varie-
ties, fertilizers and pesticides, which have resulted in large increases in pro-
duction in Asia, have not improved production levels in most parts of sub-
Saharan Africa. This has been partly due to the dominant staple crops in 
sub-Saharan Africa—tuberous plants like yam and cassava, and tropical 
grains such as millet—for which no high-yielding varieties yet exist.26 It also 
has to do with the complex agro-ecology of sub-Saharan Africa, for which it 
has turned out to be difficult to develop suitable, high-yielding crop varie-
ties. In addition, a certain inertia among international organizations special-
ized in agricultural innovation has also played a role.27  
                                                 
26  High-yielding varieties of rice and wheat did exist and these had most effect in 
irrigated areas or in rain-fed agriculture in lowlands with adequate water manage-
ment.  
27  The International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), 
the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) 
and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) specialize in these 
marginal areas but their efforts haven’t been very successful, according to Evenson 
and Gollin (2003). 
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One should not forget that many African governments pursued essen-
tially anti-rural policies following independence. And then the subsequent 
abolishment of subsidies for agricultural inputs in the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes killed agricultural productivity. Fortunately recent crop im-
provements in rice, maize and cassava are starting to bear fruit in some ar-
eas. But there are still large differences in the availability and impact of suit-
able high-yield varieties in the various agro-ecological zones of sub-Saharan 
Africa (Evenson and Gollin 2003).  
It may sound a bit strange to include Africa’s mineral wealth in this ar-
gument of the continent’s intractable geography. Moreover, sub-Saharan 
Africa was not originally known for its raw materials. However this percep-
tion has changed due to increased industrialization and the scarcity of raw 
materials in the world in general. New oilfields are rapidly being discovered 
and brought into production, new mines are being built and old ones rebuilt 
and the same goes for drilling rigs, pipelines, roads and railways and other 
related infrastructure. Foreign investment in Sudan has increased considera-
bly in the last decade because of oil; Angola’s economic prosperity is entirely 
due to oil; and Ghana and Uganda are eagerly awaiting similar results. How-
ever, the impact of sub-Saharan Africa’s mineral wealth on its development 
is not always viewed positively. Some have expected a powerful incentive for 
economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1999), while others see negative effects 
such as increased government expenditure that may result in higher debt, 
inflation and economic destabilization—the so-called Dutch disease. Ex-
ploiting raw materials has few forward or backward linkages with the rest of 
the economy. And the cumulative effect of a wealth of minerals might well 
be less instead of more economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1999).  
It is also argued that a wealth of raw materials has negative consequences 
on the process of state formation as increased investment and revenue from 
raw materials may lead to corruption. Nigeria is a good example of that. 
Countries that are dependent on their exports of raw materials appear to run a 
higher risk of civil war because rebel movements can finance their actions 
through the extortion of mine operators and traders (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004). And this brings us to the debate about the resource curse. In this view, 
the geography of Africa is indeed intractable and puts it at a constant disad-
vantage. A strong government can of course avoid any negative relationship 
between the export of raw materials and corruption or civil war, but this is 
where the debate about the neo-patrimonial state comes in again. First of all, 
in the orthodox view, the neo-patrimonial state would only redistribute 
revenue instead of investing in economic growth. And secondly, precisely 
because of the enormous amounts of money available, the state can satisfy 
everyone and the political-administrative elite becomes less sensitive to so-




cial pressure from the population.28 The example of Angola is apposite here: 
It has been characterized as a successful failing state thanks to a very effi-
ciently organized national oil company, Sonangol, that ensures a constant 
income for the political-administrative elite (Soares de Oliveira 2007). 
Now you are probably thinking, forget my suggestion that a neo-patri-
monial state can also be a developmental state. However in my view, the 
point may be that such Weberian enclaves of efficiency within the neo-pat-
rimonial state could become the new hotbeds of the developmental state. 
The conclusion here about the intractable geography of Africa cannot 
be that economic growth or state formation are determined by natural con-
ditions. In geography, the discipline that pre-eminently focuses on interac-
tions between society, space and environment, for more than a century after 
an initial dispute between two schools of thought—French possibilism and 
German determinism—one is conscious of the fact that societal processes are 
not determined by natural conditions. However, some other social scientists 
do not seem to understand that as yet. It cannot be denied that the geo-
graphical context, alongside the historical context, impacts the development 
and development potentials of sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, geo-
graphical and historical contexts are never fixed. 
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Perspektiven der Afrikaforschung und der Entwicklung im subsahari-
schen Afrika  
Zusammenfassung: In seiner Abschiedsvorlesung als Professor für Ent-
wicklung im subsaharischen Afrika an der Universität Leiden und als Direktor 
des African Studies Centre (ASC), Leiden illustriert der Autor unter Hinweis auf 
die Diskussionen um die Vuvuzelas, wie gering das Vertrauen weltweit ist, dass 
der World Cup in Südafrika reibungslos organisiert und durchgeführt werden 
kann. Er sieht dies als Beispiel dafür, dass das Stereotyp der Inkompetenz in 
Afrika – trotz der sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Fortschritte auf dem Kontinent 
in der letzten Dekade – immer noch weit verbreitet ist. Er möchte nicht darüber 
klagen, dass die Afrikaforschung bislang nicht in der Lage war, ein solches Ste-
reotyp zu beseitigen; vielmehr möchte er aufzeigen, dass die große Zahl hand-
lungsorientierter Studien in der Afrikaforschung die wesentlichen sozialen, 
politischen und ökonomischen Trends in Afrika nicht klar herausgestellt hat. Er 
plädiert für eine Erhöhung der Relevanz handlungsorientierter Forschungsan-
sätze, indem sie – durch Metaanalysen und vergleichende Forschung – zur 
Diskussion der sozialen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Trends in Afrika 
beitragen. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit solle dem möglichen Wiederaufstieg des 
Entwicklungsstaates in Afrika gewidmet werden. Damit könne die Afrikafor-
schung auch ihren Anspruch untermauern, den Universalanspruch des 
Mainstreams der Sozialwissenschaften infrage zu stellen. 
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